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Abstract	
	People	frequently	rely	on	explanations	provided	by	others	to	understand	complex	phenomena.	A	fair	amount	of	attention	has	been	devoted	to	the	study	of	scientific	explanation,	and	less	on	understanding	how	people	evaluate	naturalistic,	everyday	explanations.	Using	a	corpus	of	diverse	explanations	from	Reddit’s	“Explain	Like	I’m	Five”	and	other	online	sources,	we	assessed	how	well	a	variety	of	explanatory	criteria	predict	judgments	of	explanation	quality.	We	find	that	while	some	criteria	previously	identified	as	explanatory	virtues	do	predict	explanation	quality	in	naturalistic	settings,	other	criteria	such	as	simplicity	do	not.	Notably,	we	find	that	people	have	a	preference	for	complex	explanations	that	invoke	more	causal	mechanisms	to	explain	an	effect.	We	propose	that	this	preference	for	complexity	is	driven	by	a	desire	to	identify	enough	causes	to	make	the	effect	seem	inevitable.																							
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Evaluating	Everyday	Explanations	
	 People	are	explanatory	creatures.	We	often	seek	to	generate	explanations	based	on	our	own	knowledge	of	how	the	world	works.	However	our	ability	to	generate	complete	explanations	on	our	own	is	frequently	inadequate.	We	may	not	have	all	of	the	evidence	or	the	expertise	to	be	able	to	form	accurate	models	of	complex	phenomena.	So	we	use	the	knowledge	of	experts,	friends,	and	communities	to	piece	together	explanations.	Our	beliefs	about	science	are	not	limited	to	intuitive	preconceptions,	but	are	also	derived	from	scientists	who	inform	us	of	how	things	work.	Our	beliefs	about	the	economy	are	affected	not	only	by	our	own	experiences,	but	also	by	what	economists	and	politicians	tell	us	about	large-scale	financial	systems.	We	rely	on	the	explanations	of	others	to	form	our	own	beliefs.	How,	then,	do	we	evaluate	the	explanations	of	others?	
Explanatory	Criteria	A	common	view	has	emerged	that	the	quality	or	value	of	an	explanation	can	be	determined	by	how	well	it	satisfies	a	set	of	criteria	known	as	explanatory	virtues	(Lipton,	2004;	Thagard,	1978;	Harman,	1965;	Mackonis,	2003;	Glymour,	2014;	Lombrozo,	2011).	However,	there	is	disagreement	about	what	counts	as	an	explanatory	virtue,	how	these	virtues	are	defined	and	measured,	and	how	they	are	weighted	when	we	evaluate	an	explanation.	Two	commonly	proposed	virtues	are	simplicity	and	coherence.	For	example,	a	good	explanation	should	be	simple,	requiring	the	fewest	number	of	causes	to	explain	a	phenomenon	(e.g.,	Lombrozo,	2007).	A	good	explanation	should	also	be	coherent;	it	should	be	compatible	with	our	existing	beliefs	and	consistent	with	the	evidence	and	with	itself	(e.g.,	Thagard,	1989).	
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We	may	also	evaluate	an	explanation	using	other	criteria,	such	as	the	credibility	of	the	explainer	or	how	well	the	explanation	is	articulated,	that	do	not	reflect	the	intrinsic	value	of	an	explanation.	These	criteria	are	useful	in	satisfying	goals	beyond	identifying	the	information	inherent	to	an	explanation	(Patterson,	Operskalski,	&	Barbey,	2015).	For	instance,	a	well-articulated	explanation	can	be	useful	for	pedagogical	reasons.	The	perceived	credibility	of	an	explainer	may	affect	whether	or	not	one	believes	the	explanation,	regardless	of	its	intrinsic	merit.	While	these	criteria	do	not	affect	the	inherent	quality	of	an	explanation,	they	may	still	serve	important	pragmatic	functions	and	can	be	useful	indicators	of	explanation	quality.	
Everyday	Explanations	Philosophers	have	examined	features	central	to	scientific	explanation	that	may	improve	our	understanding.	Does	an	explanation	need	to	appeal	to	general	laws	(Hempel,	1965)?	Should	an	explanation	aim	to	unify	the	widest	range	of	phenomena	(Kitcher,	1989)?	A	common	method	in	philosophical	inquiry	is	to	analyze	existing	scientific	explanations:	what	types	of	explanations	do	scientists	provide,	and	what	makes	them	good	or	bad	explanations?		However,	many	of	the	criteria	used	for	evaluating	explanations	in	a	scientific	context	may	differ	from	the	criteria	that	are	important	for	explaining	everyday	events.	Explanations	in	non-scientific	domains	may	require	a	different	set	of	explanatory	criteria	because	they	are	structured	differently.	For	example,	historical	explanations	are	more	likely	to	appeal	to	a	narrative,	and	less	likely	to	invoke	general	laws	(Dray,	2000).		Although	some	philosophical	theories	suggest	that	abstract	explanations	are	desirable	(e.g.,	Strevens,	2007),	people	sometimes	prefer	explanations	that	are	more	
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concrete	(Bechlivanidis,	Lagnado,	Zemla	&	Sloman,	under	review)	and	less	generalizable	(Khemlani,	Sussman,	&	Oppenheimer,	2011).	Despite	philosophical	claims	that	explanations	should	be	simple	(e.g.,	Thagard,	1978),	people	tend	to	explain	inconsistencies	by	positing	additional	causes	rather	than	disputing	a	premise,	resulting	in	a	more	complex	causal	structure	(Khemlani	&	Johnson-Laird,	2011;	Johnson-Laird,	Girotto,	&	Legrenzi,	2004).	Non-scientific	explanations	may	also	serve	different	explanatory	goals.	For	instance,	Newtonian	mechanics	is	a	source	of	good	explanations	for	pedagogical	and	most	practical	purposes,	even	though	Einstein’s	relativistic	mechanics	provides	a	more	faithful	explanation	of	how	the	world	works.	In	contrast	to	the	philosophical	literature	on	explanations,	psychologists	have	tended	to	study	short	and	simple	explanations	(e.g.,	Kelemen	&	Rosset,	2009;	Weisberg,	Keil,	Goodstein,	Rawson,	&	Gray,	2008;	Cimpian	&	Salomon,	2014).	These	explanations	have	minimal	causal	structure,	often	only	a	single	causal	relation.	Some	experiments	of	this	type	rely	on	causal	inference	(e.g.,	Lombrozo,	2007;	Khemlani	et	al.,	2011);	they	ask	participants	to	identify	the	cause	or	causes	that	best	explain	the	observed	effects,	often	holding	constant	the	probability	of	an	effect	given	its	cause.	We	intend	to	test	whether	results	obtained	with	these	paradigms	also	apply	to	explanations	that	are	more	naturalistic.		Explanations	that	do	consist	of	multiple	causal	relations	require	people	to	consider	additional	criteria,	such	as	whether	there	are	gaps	in	the	causal	structure	(Keil,	2006).	For	example,	it	is	undoubtedly	true	that	leaves	change	color	in	Autumn	because	chlorophyll	in	the	leaves	breaks	down.	However	this	explanation	omits	parts	of	the	causal	model,	such	as	why	chlorophyll	causes	leaves	to	be	green,	and	what	causes	chlorophyll	to	break	down.	
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People	may	be	sensitive	to	this	omission,	leading	them	to	evaluate	the	explanation	negatively	even	if	they	agree	on	the	primary	cause.	In	more	natural	settings,	we	sometimes	construct	complex	causal	explanations	in	order	to	explain	many	pieces	of	evidence.	Pennington	and	Hastie	(1986,	1988)	found	that	people	explain	complex	events	by	constructing	stories	around	the	evidence,	and	that	these	stories	can	differ	depending	on	the	order	that	evidence	is	presented.	These	stories	can	be	evaluated	by	how	well	they	cohere	with	the	available	evidence	(Byrne,	1995)	using	a	set	of	coherence	principles	(Thagard,	1989).	It	is	generally	taken	for	granted	that	these	principles	are	desirable,	and	subsequent	work	has	provided	some	empirical	support	for	these	principles	(Read	&	Marcus-Newhall,	1993;	Schank	&	Ranney,	1992).	We	should	also	consider	how	an	explanation	fits	with	our	broader	knowledge	of	the	world.	When	evaluating	a	single	explanation,	we	should	consider	possible	alternative	explanations	(Fernbach,	Darlow,	&	Sloman,	2010)	and	counterfactuals	(Woodward	&	Hitchcock,	2003).	When	explanations	provide	evidence	in	support	of	a	causal	mechanism	(Sloman,	2005),	that	evidence	should	be	evaluated	independently	to	determine	whether	it	is	credible	and	relevant	(Kuhn,	1991).	Real-world	explanations	are	typically	more	nuanced	than	experimental	stimuli,	and	thus	provide	a	more	ecologically	valid	way	of	understanding	the	explanatory	criteria	people	use	to	evaluate	explanations.	Experimental	stimuli	used	to	test	explanatory	criteria	are	often	focused	on	a	narrow	subset	of	explanation	types—for	instance,	explanations	that	explain	token	events	or	explanations	that	explain	classes	of	events	(types),	but	not	both.	Though	many	explanatory	criteria	have	been	established	for	evaluating	scientific	explanations,	we	test	whether	those	same	criteria	are	seen	as	virtues	in	everyday	contexts.	
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In	addition,	evaluating	explanations	can	require	us	to	engage	in	a	number	of	processes	simultaneously,	including	dialectical	reasoning	(resolving	inconsistencies),	probabilistic	reasoning	(finding	the	most	likely	causes,	or	the	causes	that	make	the	effect	most	likely),	and	didactic	methods	(educating	the	reader).	We	observe	whether	previously	touted	explanatory	virtues	endure	in	the	face	of	these	multiple	goals.		
Experiment	1	To	investigate	how	people	evaluate	everyday	explanations,	we	compiled	a	small	corpus	of	explanations	that	were	generated	in	a	non-scientific	and	non-experimental	context.	Specifically,	we	gathered	explanations	from	Reddit’s	Explain	Like	I’m	Five	(ELI5;	www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive),	an	Internet	community	that	receives	roughly	7	million	unique	visitors	per	month.	The	explanations	in	our	corpus	were	rated	by	participants	on	a	host	of	explanatory	criteria	that	have	been	proposed	in	prior	literature.	
Method	 	
	 Participants.	240	participants	located	in	the	United	States	were	recruited	using	Amazon’s	Mechanical	Turk	(Paolacci,	Chandler,	&	Ipeirotis,	2010).	Five	participants	were	removed	from	the	data	set	prior	to	analyses	for	failing	an	attention	check	question1	(Oppenheimer,	Meyvis,	&	Davidenko,	2009).	Of	the	remaining	235	participants,	131	were	male	and	104	were	female,	aged	18	to	69	(median	age	of	34).	
	 Materials.	Eight	explananda2	(see	Table	1)	were	selected	from	ELI5	with	three	explanations	for	each,	for	a	total	of	24	explanations.	The	explananda	were	selected	to	fit																																																									1	Participants	were	shown	a	Likert	scale	with	the	prompt:	“To	ensure	you	are	following	instructions,	please	leave	this	question	blank	and	hit	next.”	2	Explanandum	(pl.	explananda)	refers	to	the	“thing	being	explained,”	or	the	subject	of	inquiry.	
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into	one	of	four	categories:	historical,	public	health,	legal,	and	social	policy.	These	categories	were	chosen	to	contrast	with	scientific	explanation	and	also	reflect	topics	of	interest	to	the	general	public.	By	selecting	explanations	from	several	categories,	we	sought	to	identify	whether	explanatory	criteria	are	domain-general	rather	than	apply	only	in	certain	domains.	The	explanations	also	varied	in	style,	including	a	mixture	of	token	and	type	explanations,	as	well	as	teleological	and	mechanistic	explanations.	We	selected	explananda	from	ELI5	that	had	a	high	level	of	engagement	(i.e.,	many	unique	explanations	and	many	“votes”	from	the	site’s	users).	For	each	explanandum,	we	chose	three	different	explanations	that	proposed	distinct	mechanisms	or	offered	different	evidence	in	support	of	a	given	mechanism.	In	addition,	the	specific	explanations	were	chosen	because	they	varied	
prima	facie	on	several	explanatory	criteria,	such	as	appeals	to	expertise	and	evidence,	complexity,	and	generality.		An	example	explanation	is	shown	in	Table	2,	and	all	of	the	explanations	are	provided	in	the	Supplementary	Material.	
	 Procedure.	Each	participant	was	shown	one	explanandum	with	one	corresponding	explanation.	After	reading	the	explanation	in	full,	participants	assessed	the	quality	of	the	explanation	by	rating	whether	the	text	constitutes	a	“good	explanation.”	Afterwards,	participants	rated	the	remainder	of	the	attributes	(see	Table	3)	in	a	randomized	order.	To	prevent	participants	from	referring	to	their	previous	ratings,	each	attribute	was	rated	on	its	own	page,	with	two	exceptions.	Generality	was	rated	on	the	same	page	as	principle	
consensus	because	the	latter	question	refers	to	the	former.	Evidence	credibility	and	evidence	
relevance	were	rated	last	and	on	the	same	page,	after	participants	were	asked	to	highlight	any	evidence	in	the	explanation.	All	attributes	were	rated	using	a	7-point	Likert	scale	ranging	from	Strongly	Disagree	to	Strongly	Agree.		
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Table	1.	Explananda	used	in	Experiment	1	
Explananda	
• Why	has	the	price	of	higher	education	skyrocketed	in	the	US,	and	who	is	profiting	from	it?	
• Why	don't	opponents	of	illegal	immigration	go	after	the	employers	who	hire	illegal	immigrants?	
• How	can	Malt-O-Meal	blatantly	rip	off	every	brand-name	cereal	while	Apple	and	Samsung	have	been	in	legal	issues	since	the	beginning	of	time?	
• Why	do	the	FBI	and	CIA	use	polygraph	("lie	detector")	tests	on	their	employees,	if	polygraph	tests	are	considered	pseudoscience	and	so	unreliable	that	US	courts	don't	allow	them	as	evidence?	
• If	Ebola	is	so	difficult	to	transmit	(direct	contact	with	bodily	fluids),	how	do	trained	medical	professionals	with	modern	safety	equipment	contract	the	disease?	
• Why	are	so	many	people	up	in	arms	over	“you	have	to	have	health	insurance”	initiatives,	but	are	okay	with	mandated	car	insurance?	
• Why	is	Ronald	Reagan	held	to	be	one	of	the	best	US	presidents,	even	among	scandals	like	Iran-Contra	that	would	have	destroyed	the	reputation	of	other	presidents?	
• How	has	Switzerland	managed	to	stay	in	a	neutral	position	during	times	of	conflict	like	WWII?		
	
Table	2.	An	example	explanation	used	in	Experiment	1	to	explain	“If	Ebola	is	so	difficult	to	transmit	(direct	
contact	with	bodily	fluids),	how	do	trained	medical	professionals	with	modern	safety	equipment	contract	the	
disease?		I	am	a	biomedical	scientist	and	part	of	the	Ebola	response	team	at	a	large	and	prestigious	hospital	on	the	east	coast.		1)	The	most	recent	persons	to	get	it	is	a	doctors	without	borders	doc.	What	people	don't	realize	is	that	these	doctors	go	into	"battle"	vastly	under	supplied	in	these	foreign	countries.	They	do	not	have	Tyvek	coveralls,	respirators,	gloves,	and	proper	sterilization	equipment.	A	lot	of	them	because	of	supplies	are	forced	to	use	the	same	pair	of	gloves	on	multiple	patients	for	the	day.	Some	don't	use	gloves	at	all.		2)	Taking	care	of	someone	with	Ebola	is	hell.	There	are	literally	body	fluids	everywhere.	Imagine	bloody	decomposed	fluid	oozing	out	of	every	pore	in	your	body,	plus	gallons	of	diarrhea	and	vomit.	The	protective	equipment	people	are	wearing	here	is	good,	but	only	if	it	stays	intact	and	it	doffed	correctly.	90%	of	the	infections	occur	because	the	person	contaminates	themselves	when	removing	the	soiled	equipment.		In	other	words,	taking	the	protective	gear	off	improperly	contaminates	you,	and	3rd	world	country	doctors	don't	have	the	proper	supplies.	
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Table	3.	List	of	attributes	rated	in	Experiment	1	
Attribute	 Statement	Alternatives	 There	are	probably	many	other	reasonable	alternative	explanations	Articulation	 Regardless	of	accuracy,	this	explanation	is	well	articulated	Complexity	 This	explanation	is	complex	Desired	complexity	 A	good	explanation	of	this	issue	is	likely	to	be	complex	Evidence	credibility†	 The	facts	and	data	are	accurate	Evidence	relevance†	 This	explanation	is	much	better	than	it	would	be	if	the	facts	and	data	were	not	mentioned	Expert	 This	explanation	refers	to	an	expert	External	coherence	 This	explanation	fits	with	what	I	already	know	Generality	 This	explanation	appeals	to	a	general	principle	(that	is,	a	general	rule	that	applies	to	many	things)	Incompleteness	 There	are	gaps	in	this	explanation	Internal	coherence	 The	parts	of	this	explanation	fit	together	coherently	Novelty	 I	learned	something	new	from	this	explanation	Perceived	expertise	 This	explanation	was	written	by	an	expert	in	this	topic	Perceived	truth	 I	believe	this	explanation	to	be	true	Possible	explanation	 This	issue	can	be	explained	Principle	consensus†	 Most	people	would	agree	with	this	general	principle	[following	generality]	Prior	knowledge	 I	knew	a	lot	about	this	issue	beforehand	Quality	 This	is	a	good	explanation	Requires	explanation	 This	issue	requires	an	explanation	Scope	 This	explanation	helps	explain	other	issues	besides	what	was	asked	Visualization	 It	is	easy	to	visualize	what	this	explanation	is	saying	
†These	attributes	were	rated	conditionally	upon	responses	to	other	questions,	and	as	such	have	missing	values	for	some	participants.	Evidence	credibility	and	evidence	relevance	were	required	only	if	the	participant	indicated	that	the	explanation	did	appeal	to	some	evidence.	Only	participants	who	indicated	that	an	explanation	appealed	to	a	general	principle	(generality)	were	required	to	rate	whether	most	people	would	agree	with	that	general	principle	(principle	consensus).	
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Table	4.	Means	and	SDs	for	each	attribute	as	well	as	partial	correlations	between	each	attribute	and	explanation	
quality,	controlling	for	explanandum	as	a	random	effect.	Adjusted	p-values	are	computed	using	a	full	Bonferroni	
correction	for	multiple	comparisons.	
	
	
Results	
Overview	We	first	examined	the	relation	between	explanation	quality	and	each	attribute	without	controlling	for	the	other	attributes.	A	mean	score	was	computed	for	each	attribute	for	each	of	the	24	explanations.	Partial	correlations	were	computed	using	a	mixed	effect	model	for	each	attribute,	in	each	case	treating	quality	as	the	dependent	variable,	one	of	the	twenty	remaining	attributes	as	a	fixed	effect,	and	explanandum	as	a	random	effect.	A	partial	correlation	was	used	in	place	of	a	simple	Pearson	correlation	because	the	24	data	points	are	not	truly	independent	(there	are	three	explanations	for	each	explanandum).	All	
Attribute	 M	(sd)	 R	 p	 Adjusted	p	Alternatives	 5.2	(1.4)	 -.61	 .001	 .03	Articulation	 5.3	(1.6)	 .69	 <.001	 .007	Complexity	 3.6	(1.8)	 .49	 .03	 .66	Desired-complexity	 5.1	(1.7)	 .28	 .20	 >.99	Evidence-credibility		 5.2	(1.3)	 .08	 .72	 >.99	Evidence-relevance		 3.8	(2.0)	 .03	 .91	 >.99	Expert	 3.0	(1.9)	 .38	 .07	 >.99	External-coherence	 4.5	(1.7)	 .47	 .02	 .41	Generality	 4.8	(1.5)	 .58	 .002	 .06	Incompleteness	 4.1	(1.8)	 -.65	 <.001	 .01	Internal-coherence	 5.4	(1.4)	 .82	 <.001	 <.001	Novelty	 4.6	(2.1)	 .44	 .03	 .62	Perceived-expertise	 3.7	(1.8)	 .57	 .004	 .09	Perceived-truth	 5.2	(1.6)	 .90	 <.001	 <.001	Possible-explanation	 5.8	(1.2)	 .52	 .009	 .18	Principle-consensus		 5.0	(1.3)	 .71	 <.001	 .002	Prior-knowledge	 3.6	(1.8)	 .08	 .71	 >.99	Requires-explanation	 5.2	(1.7)	 .18	 .47	 >.99	Scope	 4.3	(1.7)	 .43	 .04	 .85	Visualization	 5.7	(1.3)	 .62	 .009	 .17	
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subsequent	correlations	reported	for	Experiment	1	reflect	a	partial	R	after	controlling	for	explanandum	as	a	random	effect.	Fourteen	of	twenty	attributes	significantly	predicted	explanation	quality,	as	shown	in	Table	4.	Those	that	did	not	include:	the	desired	complexity	of	an	explanation,	whether	the	evidence	was	credible	(evidence	credibility),	whether	the	evidence	was	relevant	(evidence	
relevance),	whether	the	explanation	referred	to	an	expert,	whether	the	participant	had	a	lot	of	prior	knowledge	in	the	domain,	and	whether	the	explanandum	required	an	explanation	(requires	explanation).	To	aid	in	interpretation,	we	also	corrected	for	multiple	comparisons	using	a	full	Bonferroni	correction,	though	it	is	likely	that	this	correction	is	overly	conservative:	all	tests	were	planned	a	priori,	and	the	tested	hypotheses	are	often	complementary	rather	than	orthogonal.	Nonetheless,	six	attributes	survived	the	multiple	comparison	correction,	suggesting	that	their	relation	with	explanation	quality	may	be	particularly	strong:	whether	the	explanation	had	a	number	of	possible	alternatives,	the	
articulation	of	the	explanation,	whether	there	were	gaps	in	the	explanation	(incompleteness),	whether	the	parts	of	the	explanation	fit	together	(internal	coherence),	whether	the	explanation	was	regarded	as	true	(perceived	truth),	and	whether	most	people	agree	with	the	general	rule	provided	in	the	explanation	(principle	consensus).	Though	many	of	the	attributes	were	able	to	predict	explanation	quality,	we	also	observed	substantial	covariance	between	the	attributes.	The	attribute	correlation	matrix	(Figure	1)	depicts	the	magnitude	of	the	correlation	between	all	attributes	pairwise,	including	explanation	quality.	It	is	likely	that	many	of	these	attributes	are	not	independent	predictors	of	explanation	quality,	but	instead	reflect	a	smaller	number	of	latent	factors.	For	further	discussion	of	how	these	attributes	group	together,	see	the	Supplementary	Material.	
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Figure	 1.	 The	 magnitude	 (absolute	 value)	 of	 each	 pairwise	 correlation	 is	 shown	 after	 controlling	 for	
explanandum	 as	 a	 random	 effect.	 A	 hierarchical	 clustering	 procedure	 using	 average-linkage	 is	 shown	 to	 aid	
visualization.	
Expertise	When	evaluating	an	explanation,	it	can	be	helpful	to	assess	the	credibility	of	the	explainer.	Our	knowledge	about	an	individual	can	be	used	to	predict	what	else	that	person	is	likely	to	know	(Keil,	Stein,	Webb,	Billings,	&	Rozenblit,	2008),	which	could	play	a	role	in	judging	whether	the	premises	of	an	explanation	are	true.	However	it	is	not	always	clear	what	cues	are	used	to	judge	expertise.	For	example,	while	we	might	expect	experts	to	use	
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more	technical	language,	using	long	words	needlessly	can	make	an	author	appear	less	intelligent	(Oppenheimer,	2006).	Similarly,	scientific	jargon	does	not	always	affect	ratings	of	explanation	quality	(Weisberg,	Taylor,	&	Hopkins,	2015;	though	see	Eriksson,	2012).	Additionally,	classifying	the	explainer	as	an	expert	can	make	the	explanation	more	credible,	but	a	good	explanation	does	not	have	to	be	constructed	by	an	expert.	If	two	explanations	are	identical	except	for	their	source,	they	are	presumably	equivalent	in	their	explanatory	power	even	if	they	are	not	assigned	the	same	degree	of	belief.		We	assessed	expertise	using	two	dependent	measures:	whether	the	explanation	referred	to	an	expert	(expert)	and	whether	the	participant	believed	the	explanation	was	written	by	an	expert	(perceived	expertise).	The	two	factors	are	not	identical,	though	they	are	related,	R	=	.61,	p	=	.002.	An	explanation	can	refer	to	an	expert	by	self-identifying	the	explainer	as	an	expert,	or	by	citing	an	authoritative	source.	In	contrast,	someone	may	judge	an	explanation	to	be	written	by	an	expert	through	the	quality	of	the	language	and	level	of	technical	sophistication.	Both	factors	positively	predict	explanation	quality,	however	
perceived	expertise	is	a	stronger	predictor	(see	Table	4).	One	possibility	is	that	identifying	an	expert	primarily	serves	to	increase	the	perceived	expertise	of	the	explainer.	A	mediation	model	lends	support	to	this	hypothesis:	although	both	expert	and	perceived	expertise	are	positive	predictors	of	quality	(and	each	other),	only	perceived	expertise	is	a	significant	predictor	of	quality	when	using	multiple	regression.	Sobel’s	test	(Sobel,	1982)	confirms	that	perceived	expertise	mediates	expert	and	quality,	z(24)	=	1.87,	p	=	.06.	
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Figure	2.	Perceived	expertise	mediates	the	relation	between	expert	(reference	to	an	expert	or	self-identification)	
and	explanation	quality.		
Coherence	One	of	the	most	often	cited	explanatory	virtues	is	coherence.	Despite	having	received	much	attention	in	the	literature,	the	term	has	been	defined	in	several	different	contradictory	ways.	While	some	authors	use	coherence	to	refer	to	consistency	with	prior	knowledge	and	beliefs	(Murphy	&	Medin,	1985;	Mackonis,	2013),	other	authors	use	it	to	refer	to	whether	the	components	of	an	explanation	are	compatible	or	complement	each	other	(Thagard,	1989;	Bovens	&	Olsson,	2000;	Keil,	2006).	We	distinguish	between	internal	and	external	coherence.	External	coherence	refers	to	how	much	of	the	explanation	overlaps	or	“fits”	with	what	the	reader	already	knows.	Internal	coherence	refers	to	“how	well	the	parts	of	the	explanation	fit	together.”	We	found	that	internal	coherence	is	nearly	twice	as	predictive	as	external	coherence	(Rint	=	.82,	Rext	=	.47,	see	Table	4).	Using	multiple	regression,	after	accounting	for	internal	coherence,	external	coherence	did	not	significantly	correlate	with	quality	judgments	(Rint	=	.73,	pint	<	.001,	Rext	=	.21,	pext	=	.33).	Previous	research	has	suggested	that	people	may	not	spontaneously	generate	or	consider	possible	alternatives	when	evaluating	an	explanation	
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(Hirt	&	Markman,	1995).	This	failure	to	take	an	outside	view	when	reasoning	(Sloman	&	Lagnado,	2015)	may	explain	why	internal	coherence	takes	precedence	over	fit	with	background	knowledge.	
Articulation	Despite	providing	no	epistemic	value,	the	articulation	of	an	explanation	was	a	strong	predictor	of	perceived	explanation	quality	(R	=	.79).	We	examined	several	linguistic	markers	to	determine	if	surface	features	could	explain	perceived	articulation	and,	by	extension,	predict	explanation	quality.	Articulation	was	correlated	with	a	multitude	of	surface	features,	such	as	the	number	of	words	in	an	explanation	(R	=	.64,	p	=	.002),	the	median	word	frequency3	in	an	explanation	(R	=	-.54,	p	=	.02),	and	the	average	word	length	(R	=	.45,	p	=	.056).	Perceived	articulation	also	correlated	with	two	related	well-known	readability	metrics	(Flesch,	1948;	Kincaid,	Fishburne,	Rogers,	&	Chissom,	1975),	Flesch-Reading	Ease	(R	=	-.54,	p	=	.018),	and	Flesch-Kincaid	Grade	Level	(R	=	.63,	p	=	.003).	Additionally,	the	proportion	of	nouns	in	an	explanation	predicted	articulation	(R	=	.54,	p	=	.016).	Oddly,	none	of	these	metrics	were	significantly	correlated	with	judgments	of	explanation	quality	(all	R	<	.31,	all	p	>	.17),	with	the	exception	of	word	count	(R	=	.60,	p	=	.003).	This	finding	is	peculiar,	given	that	articulation	was	highly	correlated	with	explanation	quality.	As	such,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	whether	explanations	are	rated	highly	because	they	are	articulate,	or	whether	this	correlation	is	the	result	of	a	third	variable.	For	
																																																								3	Word	frequency	was	calculated	using	the	English	GigaWord	corpus	and	excluding	the	top	1,000	most	common	words	(most	closed-class	words).	
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instance,	an	intelligent	person	might	be	skilled	at	both	writing	and	explaining	(identifying	the	causal	structure),	even	if	one	does	not	directly	impact	the	other.		
Simplicity	A	guiding	principle	in	explanatory	reasoning	is	that	of	Occam’s	Razor:	All	things	being	equal,	the	simplest	hypothesis	should	be	preferred.	Thus,	we	initially	predicted	a	negative	correlation	between	subjective	complexity	and	explanation	quality.	Surprisingly,	we	observed	a	positive	correlation,	with	explanations	that	were	rated	as	more	complex	also	rated	as	better	explanations	(R	=	.49,	p	=	.03).	To	further	investigate	this	relationship,	we	examined	other	measures	of	complexity.	Explanations	may	be	deemed	complex	for	many	reasons,	and	it	is	not	immediately	clear	what	aspect	of	complexity	our	subjective	measure	is	capturing.	One	possibility	is	that	an	explanation	may	be	complex	because	it	appeals	to	a	large	number	of	mechanisms.	That	is,	the	explanation	suggests	the	explanandum	occurred	as	a	result	of	many	causal	pathways.	Alternatively,	an	explanation	may	be	complex	because	it	is	very	detailed.	An	explainer	may	go	into	great	detail	about	even	a	single	mechanism.	We	test	both	of	these	hypotheses.	
Causal	pathways.	One	reason	an	explanation	may	be	judged	complex	is	because	its	underlying	causal	structure	appeals	to	a	large	number	of	mechanisms.	The	four	authors	jointly	identified	the	causal	model	for	each	of	the	24	explanations	in	our	corpus	(see	Figure	3	for	an	example;	all	of	the	causal	models	are	provided	in	the	Supplementary	Material)	by	identifying	causal	language	in	the	explanation	(Sloman,	2005).	Each	node	in	a	causal	model	represents	a	cause	or	effect,	or	both.	Node	labels	were	used	as	shorthand	to	represent	the	underlying	cause	or	effect.	A	directed	link	from	node	A	to	node	B	indicates	that	A	is	a	cause	of	B,	though	not	necessarily	a	sufficient	cause.	Non-causal	information,	such	as	the	
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credibility	of	the	speaker	or	flowery	language,	was	not	included	in	the	causal	model.	Simple	facts	that	are	not	causally	related	to	the	rest	of	the	explanation	were	also	excluded.	Specific	anecdotes	and	evidence	used	in	the	explanation	were	represented	in	the	causal	model	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	causal	relations	were	distilled	from	more	concrete	examples.	The	causal	models	were	constructed	to	be	acyclic,	consistent	with	Bayesian	graphical	models	used	elsewhere	(e.g.,	Sloman,	2005).	Though	this	process	is	somewhat	subjective,	we	converged	on	a	single	causal	model	for	each	explanation.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3.	An	example	causal	model	reflecting	the	explanation	shown	in	Table	2.	The	causal	model	shows	three	
root	causes	(depicted	with	a	dashed	border)	that	are	connected	to	the	explanandum	(contracting	Ebola).	We	estimated	the	number	of	causal	mechanisms	in	an	explanation	by	counting	the	number	of	root	causes	in	the	model	(nodes	without	a	parent	node	and	connected	by	some	pathway	to	the	explanandum).	This	measure	is	consistent	with	previous	research	that	suggests	the	number	of	unexplained	causes,	rather	than	the	absolute	number	of	causes,	has	
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an	impact	on	explanation	judgments	(Lombrozo	&	Vasilyeva,	in	press).	As	predicted,	the	number	of	root	causes	significantly	predicts	explanation	quality,	R	=	.64,	p	=	.005.	A	reasonable	objection	might	be	that	explanations	that	appeal	to	more	causes	also	explain	more	effects.	However,	the	correlation	remains	significant	even	when	we	control	for	the	number	of	final	effect	nodes	in	the	model	and	a	subjective	measure	of	how	much	the	explanation	explains	(scope),	R	=	.63,	p	=	.015.	
Explanation	length.	Another	reason	an	explanation	may	be	complex	is	because	it	contains	a	lot	of	details.	One	way	to	operationalize	this	is	to	simply	count	the	number	of	words	in	an	explanation.	Those	explanations	that	use	more	words	to	describe	the	causal	system	can	be	seen	as	more	detailed.	Indeed,	we	found	that	as	the	length	of	an	explanation	increased,	so	did	its	perceived	quality,	R	=	.60,	p	=	.004.	Furthermore,	it	appears	that	the	number	of	causal	mechanisms	and	explanation	length	are	independent	predictors	of	explanation	quality,	as	both	are	significant	predictors	in	a	multiple	regression,	Rwords	=	.52,	(p	=	.02),	Rroot_nodes	=	.51	(p	=	.03).	One	caveat	is	that	explanation	length	is	also	correlated	with	articulation,	as	reported	earlier.	When	subjective	articulation	was	included	in	the	regression	analysis,	explanation	length	no	longer	predicted	perceived	quality,	Rwords	=	.26	(p	=	.27),	Rroot_nodes	=	.43	(p	=	.08),	Rarticulation	=	.44	(p	=	.04),	indicating	shared	variance	between	the	three	attributes.	
Complexity	and	Expertise.		Complexity	may	also	have	indirect	effects	on	ratings	of	explanation	quality.	For	example,	it	is	possible	that	a	complex	explanation	may	make	the	explainer	seem	knowledgeable,	which	in	turn	increases	the	quality	of	an	explanation.	Explanation	quality	is	significantly	correlated	with	both	perceived	expertise	and	judgments	of	complexity	(see	Table	4).	In	addition,	subjective	complexity	is	strongly	correlated	with	
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perceived	expertise,	R	=	.55,	p	=	.008.	We	tested	the	hypothesis	that	perceived	expertise	mediates	the	relationship	between	complexity	and	explanation	quality.	However	Sobel’s	test	for	mediation	(Figure	4)	does	not	reach	significance	(z	=	1.7,	p	=	.088).	
	
Figure	4.	Perceived	expertise	is	strongly	related	to	both	complexity	and	explanation	quality,	though	it	is	not	a	
significant	mediator.		 We	also	conducted	a	multiple	regression	analysis	to	see	if	perceived	expertise	could	explain	variance	in	explanation	quality	ratings	independent	of	other	measures	of	complexity	(subjective	complexity,	explanation	length,	and	number	of	root	causes).	Although	subjective	complexity	is	no	longer	significant	in	this	analysis	(see	Table	5),	the	other	predictors	remain	significant.	This	finding	suggests	that	although	all	of	the	factors	in	Table	5	reflect	measures	of	complexity,	these	factors	are	not	interchangeable.	
Table	5.	Using	multiple	regression	analysis,	explanation	length,	number	of	root	causes,	and	perceived	expertise	
each	significantly	predict	explanation	quality	ratings.	
	 Partial	R	 p	
Explanation	length	 .50	 .02	
Root	causes	 .50	 .046	
Subjective	complexity	 -.33	 .14	
Perceived	Expertise	 .50	 .02		
Incompleteness			 We	expected	that	explanations	containing	gaps	in	the	proposed	causal	mechanisms	would	be	rated	lower	than	explanations	that	did	not	contain	any	gaps.	That	is,	if	an	
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explanation	suggests	that	A	causes	B,	but	it	is	not	immediately	clear	how	A	causes	B,	participants	will	be	sensitive	to	this	omission.	In	support	of	this,	we	found	that	ratings	of	
incompleteness	(whether	“there	are	gaps	in	the	explanation”)	significantly	correlated	with	explanation	quality	(R	=	-.65,	p	<	.001).	We	explored	this	further	by	examining	the	average	path	length	in	each	of	the	causal	models,	measuring	the	average	number	of	steps	from	a	root	cause	to	the	explanandum.	Pathways	that	contain	more	steps	are	likely	to	contain	fewer	gaps,	and	could	be	rated	higher.	However,	this	was	not	the	case,	R	=	.08,	p	=	.74.	
Discussion	
	 These	findings	suggest	that	the	explanatory	criteria	used	to	evaluate	everyday	explanations	may	differ	from	those	previously	identified.	The	biggest	departure	from	existing	theories	is	the	finding	that	people	prefer	complex	explanations—specifically,	a	preference	for	explanations	that	appeal	to	multiple	causal	mechanisms	(though	see	Ahn	&	Bailenson,	1996).	One	limitation	of	the	study,	however,	is	its	reliance	on	correlational	analyses.	In	addition,	by	using	naturalistic	explanations	that	were	not	modified	extensively,	the	explanations	vary	in	many	respects	other	than	complexity.	To	address	these	concerns,	we	conducted	an	additional	experiment	that	manipulated	the	number	of	mechanisms	present	in	each	explanation.	
Experiment	2	We	conducted	a	follow-up	study	using	controlled	stimuli	to	examine	whether	explanations	with	multiple	independent	causal	pathways	are	preferred.	We	expected	that	people	would	prefer	explanations	that	appeal	to	multiple	causal	mechanisms,	even	when	a	single	mechanism	is	sufficient.		
																																																																									EVALUATING	EVERYDAY	EXPLANATIONS	 22	
Method	
Participants.	90	participants	located	in	the	United	States	participated	in	the	experiment	via	Amazon’s	Mechanical	Turk.	
Materials.	For	each	of	the	six	explananda	listed	in	Table	6,	we	created	two	explanations	(denoted	A	and	B)	that	appeal	to	entirely	distinct	mechanisms.	Explanations	were	constructed	from	those	found	online	using	multiple	online	sources,	including	Reddit,	Wikipedia,	and	HowThingsWork.com.	For	instance,	one	explanation	for	why	China’s	population	is	rising	despite	their	one-child	policy	is	because	ethnic	minorities	and	rural	populations	are	exempt	from	the	rule;	another	explanation	suggests	that	Chinese	are	living	longer	on	average	and	that	wealthy	couples	can	afford	to	pay	fines	associated	with	violating	the	policy.	Explanations	were	designed	to	be	roughly	equal	in	length,	amount	of	detail,	and	number	of	mechanisms.	We	also	created	a	third	explanation	that	was	simply	a	concatenation	of	the	other	two	(denoted	AB).	This	explanation	encompasses	the	other	two	as	it	appeals	to	all	of	the	causal	mechanisms	in	A	and	B	and	does	not	vary	in	any	other	way.	See	the	Supplementary	Material	for	the	full	text	of	each	explanation	used	in	the	study.	
Procedure.	Participants	read	an	explanandum	and	were	asked	to	make	two	ratings	on	a	7-point	Likert	scale:	“How	many	reasons	or	mechanisms	should	a	good	answer	to	this	question	include?”	and	“How	detailed	should	a	good	answer	to	this	question	be?”	The	response	scale	for	both	questions	was	ordinal,	ranging	from	“1	–	A	good	answer	would	offer	only	one	reason	or	mechanism”	to	“7-	A	good	answer	would	appeal	to	many	reasons	or	mechanisms”	for	the	former	question,	and	from	“1	–	Very	little	detail	is	needed”	to	“7	–	A	lot	of	details	are	needed”	for	the	latter	question.	
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On	the	following	page,	participants	read	the	full	explanation	and	rated	the	number	of	mechanisms	in	the	explanation	(from	“1	–	Only	a	single	mechanism”	to	“7	–	A	lot	of	mechanisms”),	the	amount	of	detail	in	the	explanation	(from	“1	–	Not	detailed	at	all”	to	“7	–	Very	detailed”),	the	overall	quality	of	the	explanation	(whether	it	was	a	“good”	explanation	to	the	question	being	asked,	from	“1	–	Strongly	disagree”	to	“7	–	Strongly	agree”),	and	whether	the	participant	learned	a	lot	from	the	explanation	(from	“1	–	I	didn’t	learn	anything	at	all”	to	“7	–	I	learned	a	great	deal”).		This	procedure	was	repeated	for	all	six	explananda.	Each	participant	was	shown	only	one	of	three	explanations	(A,	B,	or	AB)	for	each	explanandum.	The	explanations	were	counterbalanced	so	that	each	explanation	was	presented	to	exactly	30	participants.	The	order	of	the	explanations	was	also	counterbalanced.	Prior	to	beginning	the	experiment,	participants	were	shown	an	example	explanation	and	informed	of	the	types	of	questions	they	would	be	answering.	
Table	6.	List	of	explananda	used	in	Experiment	2.	
Explananda	
• Why	isn’t	China's	population	declining	if	they	have	had	a	one-child	policy	for	35	years?	
• Why	are	cancer	rates	increasing?	
• How	did	the	Black	Death	in	the	14th	century	come	to	an	end?	
• How	do	vaccines	work?		
• How	do	“speed	limits	enforced	by	aircraft”	signs	work?	
• Before	the	invention	of	radio	communication,	how	did	a	country	at	war	communicate	with	their	navy	while	they	were	out	at	sea?	
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Figure	5.	Participants	were	shown	one	explanation	(A,	B,	or	AB)	for	each	of	the	six	explananda.	The	AB	
explanations	were	rated	as	appealing	to	more	mechanisms	than	the	A	and	B	explanations.	The	response	scale	
ranged	from	“1	–	Only	a	single	mechanism”	to	“7	–	A	lot	of	mechanisms.”	Error	bars	denote	standard	error	of	the	
mean.	
	
Figure	6.	Participants	were	shown	one	explanation	(A,	B,	or	AB)	for	each	of	the	six	explananda.	The	AB	
explanations	were	rated	as	better	explanations	than	the	A	and	B	explanations.	Error	bars	denote	standard	error	
of	the	mean.	
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Results	For	all	six	explananda,	the	concatenated	AB	explanation	was	rated	as	having	more	mechanisms	than	the	A	and	B	explanations	(pooled),	all	p	<	.05.	In	five	cases,	the	AB	explanation	was	rated	as	having	significantly	more	mechanisms	than	its	nearest	competitor	(A	or	B;	all	p	<	.05	except	pships	=	.12).	See	Figure	5.	This	validates	our	manipulation—explanations	with	more	mechanisms	were	rated	as	such.	Additionally,	AB	explanations	were	rated	as	having	more	details	than	their	corresponding	A	and	B	explanations	for	all	six	explananda	(pooled),	as	well	as	having	more	details	than	their	nearest	competitor	(A	or	B),	all	p	<	.001.	In	all	six	explananda,	the	quality	of	the	AB	explanation	was	rated	significantly	higher	than	the	individual	A	and	B	explanations	(pooled),	all	p	<	.05.	See	Figure	6.	The	concatenated	explanation	(AB)	typically	performed	better	than	the	second-most	preferred	explanation	(A	or	B);	significant	in	three	explanations	(p	<	.05),	nearly	significant	in	one	(pships	=	.07)	and	not	significant	in	two	(pplague	=	.3,	pvaccines	=	.77).	All	of	the	component	explanations	(A	or	B)	except	one	were	rated	as	above	average	in	quality	(above	the	midpoint).	Despite	this,	participants	showed	a	preference	for	the	concatenated	explanation	(AB)	in	each	case.	In	addition,	75	of	90	participants	rated	AB	explanations	higher	on	average	compared	to	A	or	B	explanations	(across	all	six	explananda),	binomial	test	p	<	.001.	
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Figure	7.	Participants	were	shown	one	explanation	(A,	B,	or	AB)	for	each	of	the	six	explananda.	Prior	to	seeing	an	
explanation,	they	rated	how	many	mechanisms	“a	good	explanation	to	the	question	should	include,”	and	after	
reading	the	explanation	rated	“how	many	mechanisms	does	this	explanation	appeal	to”.	The	y-axis	denotes	the	
latter	minus	the	former.	Error	bars	denote	standard	error	of	the	mean.	Perhaps	participants	judged	AB	explanations	as	better	because	the	phenomena	to	be	explained	were	complicated,	and	thus	benefited	from	an	appeal	to	numerous	mechanisms.	Prior	to	reading	each	explanation,	participants	indicated	that	a	good	explanation	should	appeal	to	multiple	mechanisms	(mean	ratings	for	the	six	explananda	range	from	3.8	to	5.7).	We	explored	this	possibility	further	by	examining	the	relative	complexity	of	each	explanation:	whether	an	explanation	that	appealed	to	more	mechanisms	than	a	“good	explanation	to	the	question	should	include”	would	still	be	preferred.	We	calculated	a	measure	of	relative	complexity	for	each	explanation	by	subtracting	the	mean	rating	of	the	number	of	mechanisms	a	good	explanation	should	appeal	to	from	the	mean	rating	of	the	number	of	mechanisms	the	explanation	did	appeal	to.	As	shown	in	Figure	7,	the	majority	of	
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the	AB	explanations	appealed	to	more	mechanisms	than	initially	expected	from	a	good	explanation.		Furthermore,	this	relative	complexity	measure	predicted	quality	ratings	as	well	or	better	than	the	ordinal	rating	of	number	of	mechanisms	alone.	Multiple	regression	controlling	for	explanandum	found	a	near-significant	effect	of	relative	complexity	(partial	R	=	.45,	p	=	.07)	but	no	significant	effect	of	the	number	of	mechanisms	(partial	R	=	.26,	p	=	.31).	However,	we	found	no	evidence	that	an	explanation	could	suffer	from	being	“too	complex”;	in	no	case	was	the	AB	explanation	rated	worse	than	either	of	its	component	explanations.	
Discussion		 Using	controlled	stimuli	that	differed	only	in	the	number	of	mechanisms,	we	replicated	one	of	the	key	findings	of	Experiment	1,	showing	that	people	prefer	explanations	that	appeal	to	multiple	causal	mechanisms.	We	found	that	the	relative	complexity	(observed	minus	expected	complexity)	was	a	strong	predictor	of	explanation	quality,	however	even	those	explanations	that	were	“too	complex”	were	rated	highly.	These	results	contrast	with	previous	findings	that	have	shown	people	prefer	explanations	that	appeal	to	the	fewest	number	of	causes	(Lombrozo,	2007;	Read	&	Marcus-Newhall,	1993).	One	possible	reason	for	the	discrepancy	is	that	our	participants	are	driven	by	the	desire	to	know	that	the	explanandum	is	fully	accounted	for.	In	probabilistic	terms,	this	is	best	represented	as	the	likelihood	of	the	explanandum	given	a	set	of	causes.	This	interpretation	is	consistent	with	some	previous	findings	(Pacer,	Williams,	Lombrozo,	Xi,	&	Griffiths,	2013;	Vasilyeva	&	Lombrozo,	2015).	Providing	additional	causes	typically	increases	the	likelihood	of	the	explanandum,	making	it	seem	inevitable.	This	hypothesis	
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leads	to	an	interesting	prediction	that	complex	explanations	should	not	be	preferred	after	controlling	for	the	likelihood	of	the	explanandum.	In	contrast,	experiments	that	use	causal	inference	paradigms	require	participants	to	select	the	causes	that	best	explain	the	observed	data.	For	instance,	Lombrozo	(2007)	uses	a	causal	inference	paradigm	to	provide	support	for	the	simplicity	principle,	but	instructs	participants	that	the	effect	always	follows	from	a	cause—thus,	regardless	of	which	explanation	a	participant	prefers,	the	explanandum	is	inevitable.	It	is	possible	that	causal	inference	paradigms	overemphasize	a	particular	explanatory	goal:	selecting	the	most	likely	cause.		Our	data	are	inconsistent	with	an	alternative	hypothesis	that	participants	should	prefer	explanations	that	increase	the	likelihood	of	a	set	of	causes	given	the	explanandum	(Pearl,	1988).	This	hypothesis	predicts	a	preference	for	simplicity,	as	the	likelihood	of	a	set	of	causes	necessarily	decreases	(or	remains	the	same)	as	additional	causes	are	proposed.	Moreover,	an	emphasis	on	predictive,	as	opposed	to	diagnostic	reasoning,	may	lead	people	to	endorse	causes	that	are	not	true.	For	instance,	one	explanation	suggested	that	China’s	population	is	growing	in	part	because	of	a	decline	in	the	death	rate,	despite	the	fact	that	the	death	rate	has	actually	increased	slightly	since	the	one-child	policy	took	effect	(The	World	Bank,	2015).	Our	results	suggest	that	when	participants	are	not	judging	whether	a	cause	is	true	(as	in	causal	inference	paradigms),	they	may	not	evaluate	the	likelihood	of	the	causes	at	all	and	instead	assume	them	to	be	true	(Fricker,	2002).	Another	possibility	is	that	people	sometimes	prefer	simple	explanations	because	natural	phenomena	are	often	the	result	of	few	causal	mechanisms.	Thomas	Aquinas	(1948)	advocates	for	simplicity	in	his	claim	that	“nature	does	not	employ	two	instruments	when	one	suffices.”	In	this	sense,	a	preference	for	simplicity	could	be	a	rational	adaptation	to	the	
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environment.	However,	many	phenomena	have	complex	antecedents.	Carruthers	(2006)	counters	that	biological	explanations	may	not	be	simple	because	“one	should	expect	biological	systems	to	be	messy	and	complicated,	full	of	exaptations	and	smart	kludges”	(p.	151).	Similarly,	Salmon	(2001)	argues	that	the	“desirability	of	simplicity	seems	to	be	an	empirical	question.	In	the	social	sciences,	for	example,	it	appears	that	simple	hypotheses	may	be	considered	implausible	because	they	are	apt	to	be	oversimplifications”	(p.	129).	Our	results	echo	Carruthers	and	Salmon:	even	prior	to	reading	an	explanation,	participants	expected	each	explanandum	to	be	explained	through	multiple	causal	mechanisms,	and	so	single-cause	explanations	may	have	appeared	too	simplistic.	
General	Discussion	
	 Everyday	explanations	differ	from	scientific	explanations	in	their	structure	and	in	their	goals.	In	Experiment	1,	we	evaluated	potential	explanatory	criteria	and	found	that	some	explanatory	virtues,	such	as	internal	coherence,	are	good	predictors	of	explanation	quality	even	for	everyday	explanations.	However	other	criteria	such	as	articulation	and	perceived	expertise	are	also	highly	predictive,	even	though	they	do	not	reflect	the	intrinsic	quality	of	an	explanation.	In	two	experiments,	we	find	evidence	that	when	evaluating	explanations,	people	prefer	explanations	that	are	subjectively	complex	and	appeal	to	multiple	causal	mechanisms.	While	this	finding	is	at	odds	with	claims	that	simpler	explanations	are	usually	better,	it	is	consistent	with	prominent	theories	in	philosophy	that	suggest	the	role	of	an	explanation	is	to	identify	the	causal	network	of	events	leading	up	to	an	event	(Salmon,	1984;	Strevens,	2008).	The	explanations	used	in	the	present	experiments	differ	from	those	often	used	in	the	psychological	literature	because	they	attempt	to	be	complete	and,	for	the	
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most	part,	describe	the	causal	mechanisms	that	led	to	an	event.	Rather	than	asking	participants	to	ascribe	causes	to	events	or	adjudicate	between	simple	causes,	participants	were	asked	to	evaluate	the	aptness	of	an	entire	causal	system.		 The	ubiquity	of	explanations	in	our	lives	leads	us	to	constantly	evaluate	potential	causal	mechanisms	affecting	the	world.	Deepening	our	understanding	of	what	leads	us	to	accept	some	explanations	and	reject	others	has	implications	for	scientific	communication,	pubic	policy,	legal	precedents,	and	beyond.	Our	current	findings	suggest	that	everyday	explanatory	practices	are	more	complex	and	nuanced	than	previously	thought.			
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